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TO: 
FROM: 
RE: 
LAW DEPARTMENT 
100 CHURCH STREET 
NEW YORK. N.Y. 10007 
PETER L. ZIMROTH 
Corporation Counsel 
MEMORANDUM 
ERIC LANE 
Executive Director/Counsel 
New York City 
Charter Revision Commission 
PAUL T. REPHEN ~,~ 
Chief 
Legal Counsel Division 
Substantial Evidence 
(212) 566-2202 
July 12, 1988 
At our meeting last Wednesday you advised me that the 
Charter Revision Commission is considering whether to require that all 
determinations made by City agencies following hearings under the 
proposed City Administrative Procedure Act be supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence. It is my understanding that the 
Commission intends that this standard of review be applied by the 
courts in proceedings seeking review of such determinations. 
CPLR 17803(4), however, specifically states that a court 
may only inquire 
···whether a determination made as a result 
of a hearing held, and at which evidence 
was taken, pursuant to direction -by law is, 
on the entire record, supported by 
substantial evidence. 
The Charter Revision Commission cannot supersede a general statute 
of statewide applicability. Therefore, it is our view that the 
Commission is preempted from imposing a standard of review which 
differs from that set forth in CPLR 17803(4). 
As you are aware, the Court of Appeals has specifically 
held that the substantial evidence standard does not require a 
showing that the administrative determination be supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 300 Gramatan Ave. Associates v. 
State Division of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180-181 (1978). In 
that case, the Court held that substantial evidence: 
···is related to the charge or controversy 
and involves a weighing of the quality and 
quantity of the proof; it means such relevant 
proof as a reasonable mind may accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate 
fact. Essential attributes are relevance and 
a probative character. Marked by its 
substance -- its solid nature and ability to 
inspire confidence, substantial evidence does 
not rise from bare surmise, conjecture, 
speculation or rumor. More than seeming or 
imaginary, it is less than a preponderance of 
the evidence, overwhelming evidence or 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(Emphasis added and citations omitted.) 
The substantial evidence standard as delineated by the 
Court in 300 Gramatan Ave. Associates has been the rule in this State 
for almost fifty years (see Matter of Stork Restaurant v. Boland, 282 
N. Y. 256, 273-275 [1940]; 1 Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in 
New York 328-340 [1942]), and reflects the fact that the Legislature 
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has assigned to administrative agencies rather than the courts 
responsibility for conducting specified hearings. Under this 
standard, the court decides questions of law but limits itself to the 
test of reasonableness in reviewing findings of facts made by the 
administrative agency. The substantial evidence rule is a test of 
rationality, taking into account all the evidence on both sides. 
The rule is applied under CPLR 17803(4) to determinations 
made following hearings by all agencies of the State, its counties, 
municipalities, school districts and other public entities. Its 
constitutionality has never been questioned, and we are unaware of 
any recognized authority which has criticized the rule as applied in 
this state. Indeed, I am unaware of any prior effort, either in the 
Legislature or in the City Council, to alter this standard of review of 
administrative determinations. 
The Commission has thus far offered no reason for its 
unprecedented proposal, which would subject New York City to a 
more burdensome standard of review to which neither the State of 
New York nor any other governmental entity in this state is 
subjected. The vast majority of our substantial evidence cases are 
police officer and correction officer disciplinary cases, and we prevail 
in well over ninety percent of them. If the Commission's proposal is 
adopted, the task of disciplining or removing police officers and 
correction officers who have engaged in serious misconduct would 
become greater. Undoubtedly, some officers whose dismissals are 
presently sustained by the appellate courts under the substantial 
evidence rule would prevail under a preponderance of the evidence 
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standard. I fail to understand how the public interest would be 
served by a rejection of this traditional and accepted standard of 
review. 
The proposal might have additional serious consequences. 
CPLR §7804(g) states that where an issue is raised under 17803(4) 
(i.e., whether a determination following a hearing is supported by 
substantial evidence), the Supreme Court, without reviewing the 
case, shall transfer the proceeding to the appropriate Appellate 
Division. The rationale for this section is that the petitioner has 
already had his or her trial before the administrative agency and 
should, therefore, proceed directly to appellate review. If a 
preponderance of the evidence standard is imposed by the 
Commission, it is not clear whether City administrative determinations 
could continue to be transferred directly to the Appellate Division for 
review because no issues concerning substantial evidence would be 
involved. If these cases can no longer be transferred to the 
Appellate Division, the cost to all parties (and the courts) of 
litigating them will be increased and the time required to finally 
resolve them will be lengthened. 
Under the substantial evidence rule set forth in CPLR 
17803( 4), a determination may be made on the basis of evidence which 
would be inadmissible in a jury trial. The only requirement is that 
the evidence be reliable and substantial. See 300 Gramatan Ave. 
Associates v. State Division of Human Rights, supra at 45 NY2d 180 
note; 8 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ. Prac., par 7803.09. Thus, a 
police officer may be disciplined on the basis of reliable and 
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substantial hearsay evidence or on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice. See Matter of Berenhaus v. Ward, 70 NY2d 436 (1987). 
If the Commission attempts to alter the substantial evidence test, it is 
doubtful whether this more liberal evidentiary rule would continue to 
be applicable in City administrative hearings. The Commission should 
avoid the bizarre result whereby evidence which would sustain the 
removal of a corrupt police officer of Albany or Buffalo would not 
sustain the removal of a corrupt officer in New York City. 
In summary, it is our view that the Charter Revision 
Commission has no legal authority to impose a standard of review 
which is more burdensome on the City than the substantial evidence 
rule. The Commission has not presented any evidence which suggests 
that the application of that rule is unfair or leads to abuse. To the 
contrary, the substantial evidence rule, as described by the Court in 
Gramatan, is protective of the rights of those who participate in 
administrative adjudications. In order for evidence to be substantial, 
it must be "solid" and "inspire confidence" and cannot be 
"conjecture", "surmise", or "rumor". In view of these facts, the 
imposition of a more burdensome standard on the City, even assuming 
that the Commission possessed such power, would be totally 
unjustified and contrary to the public interest. 
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